A Ceasefire Is Not a Settlement: Reported Breaches of the Kuala Lumpur Accord

A ceasefire can silence the guns, but it cannot settle a border. One year after the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, the real test for Cambodia and Thailand is whether their commitments are being kept on the ground, not simply whether they have been signed.
For Cambodia, reports of families still unable to return home and claims of military construction in contested areas raise hard questions about what the peace process is delivering. These claims deserve close scrutiny. They should be measured against the agreements themselves, but they should not be treated as proven facts without evidence.
The aim should not be to stoke nationalism or prejudge territorial claims. It should be to establish what is actually happening, uphold the agreements, protect civilians, and make sure neither side treats a temporary military advantage as a substitute for a lawful, negotiated settlement.
What Both Sides Committed To
The Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, signed on October 26, 2025, reaffirmed both countries' pledges to settle disputes peacefully, respect international law and existing boundaries, and carry out agreed de-escalation measures. It also acknowledged the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) and the bilateral mechanisms already in place for border issues.
The Joint Statement of the Third Special General Border Committee (GBC), signed on December 27, 2025, set out more specific obligations. Both sides agreed to keep current troop deployments in place without further movement, to resume survey and demarcation work through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC), and to allow displaced civilians to return safely, without obstruction, and with dignity. They also agreed to avoid provocative acts and to refrain from building or expanding military infrastructure or fortifications beyond their own territory.
These provisions matter because peace is more than the absence of fighting. It depends on restraint, predictability, adherence to agreed procedures, and practical steps that allow ordinary life to resume.
The central question, then, is whether conduct reported since the ceasefire fits with what both governments accepted. That can only be answered by weighing evidence against the relevant agreements, not by trading accusations.
Displacement and the Allegations
The humanitarian situation remains deeply troubling. On September 17, 2026, Cambodia's Ministry of National Defence said 3,318 families, or 13,259 people, in Banteay Meanchey province were still unable to return home. The ministry blamed extensive damage from bombardment, airstrikes and artillery, as well as what it described as occupation by Thai military forces.
On October 7, 2026, Cambodian authorities reported that 1,114 civilians from 357 families were still barred from their homes in the An Ses area of Preah Vihear province. The ministry alleged that Thai military personnel had placed shipping containers, installed barbed wire, dug trenches and built fortifications, and that houses, infrastructure and civilian property had been damaged.
These are serious claims made by Cambodian authorities, and they should be presented as such. The reports do not, on their own, amount to a final independent finding on each incident, its exact location or its legal character. Even so, the scale of continuing displacement calls for a substantive response and credible verification.
Behind every figure are families whose homes, livelihoods, schooling and sense of security have been disrupted. Their right to return should not be treated as a secondary issue to be addressed only once relations improve. Safe and voluntary return is itself a key measure of whether peace is taking hold.
Both governments should allow impartial verification, protect civilians and publish reliable information about affected areas. Where breaches are confirmed, the responsible party should take appropriate corrective action.
Physical Control Is Not Legal Title
The reports of containers, trenches, barbed wire and fortifications raise a basic point: physical control on the ground does not, by itself, create lawful territorial title.
A military position can demonstrate effective presence, but it does not automatically fix the international boundary or resolve competing legal claims. Those questions must be judged under the applicable treaties, boundary instruments, maps, official records, relevant historical evidence and principles of international law.
Cambodia and Thailand already have a framework for this, including the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary, which provides for joint technical work and peaceful consultation. The December 2025 GBC statement further directs both countries to resume survey and demarcation through the JBC at the earliest opportunity.
At the same time, not every structure or change on the ground is automatically a legal violation. The location of the activity, the status of the area, the governing agreement and the available evidence all matter.
Still, where military infrastructure is established or strengthened on the other state's territory, or in ways that contradict agreed restraint, the issue cannot be dismissed just because the structures are already there. Neither the passage of time nor additional fortifications should be allowed to stand in for a lawful boundary settlement. The governing principle must be that territorial claims are resolved through law and agreed procedures, not through facts imposed unilaterally.
The JBC as a Practical Test
Restarting the JBC is one of the clearest practical steps available to both governments. It is not a symbolic concession from either side. It is a bilateral body designed to carry out the technical work needed to clarify and demarcate the boundary.
Thailand has raised concerns about the security conditions needed for effective JBC work, including landmine risks and threats in border areas. These concerns deserve serious attention. Survey teams must be able to work safely, and humanitarian demining must be coordinated with technical boundary work.
Security concerns, however, should prompt practical arrangements rather than indefinite delay. The two sides can identify priority areas, agree on safety protocols, coordinate demining where necessary and adopt a transparent timetable for technical work.
The JBC will not resolve every question of sovereignty, military conduct or civilian return. Its value lies in reducing uncertainty and providing a structured route for boundary questions. A jointly surveyed and demarcated boundary would give both countries a more reliable reference point for preventing disputes and for assessing future allegations of incursion.
Progress should therefore be judged by concrete results: meetings held, technical work resumed, priority areas agreed and verifiable steps taken to ease tensions. The JBC should not become a public-relations tool while the practical work remains stalled.