Thailand's Strategy for Holding Onto Disputed Cambodian Territory

The Cambodia–Thailand border dispute is about more than where a line falls on a map. It touches on national sovereignty, the obligation to respect international law, the durability of boundaries set by past agreements, and the duty of neighbouring states to settle territorial questions through peaceful, mutually agreed channels.
The central concern is whether one side can keep physical control of contested land while technical demarcation remains stalled. If it can, the situation on the ground could gradually shift in ways that weaken Cambodia's territorial rights.
Cambodia's position has been consistent. It holds that the international boundary with Thailand must be determined by the relevant historical treaties, recognised legal principles, documents both sides have acknowledged, and bilateral agreements. Thailand, Cambodia argues, should respect those foundations rather than take unilateral steps that complicate a peaceful solution.
Unilateral Maps Cannot Replace Agreed Boundaries
A major source of friction is the question of maps. A state cannot claim sovereignty over another state's land simply by drawing its own map, publishing it, or relying on it for administrative or military purposes.
Boundaries have to be assessed against the treaties, conventions, historical records, agreed boundary documents, and principles of international law that apply. For Cambodia and Thailand, the Franco-Siamese Conventions of 1904, the Treaty of 1907, and the maps and papers produced by the historical boundary commissions form the core reference points. The 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two countries also provides a framework for joint surveys and demarcation along the land border.
For these reasons, Thailand cannot legitimately replace the agreed boundary framework with its own cartographic reading. Any disagreement over maps should be resolved through evidence-based technical discussion and established legal procedures, not through unilateral declarations or military control.
Maps are meant to help define and clarify boundaries under international law. They should not become tools for enlarging territorial claims at a neighbour's expense.
Stalled JBC Work: A Major Obstacle to Peace
The Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) is the main bilateral body set up to survey and demarcate the shared land border. Under the 2000 MoU, both countries are bound to cooperate on identifying boundary markers, carrying out joint technical surveys, and following agreed procedures.
In practice, the mechanism has been delayed again and again. Cambodia has repeatedly asked for JBC meetings to resume and for Joint Survey Teams (JSTs) to be deployed in disputed areas. On February 1, 2026, the Cambodian government publicly confirmed that it had again proposed deploying joint survey teams and holding technical meetings. In the same statement, it protested against Thai military activity that it said was altering conditions in border areas.
The key question is why technical demarcation keeps running into obstacles when both governments have already agreed that the JBC should resume its work.
Thailand has previously pointed to internal administrative procedures, the formation of its government, and the need to appoint JBC representatives as reasons for postponing meetings. Those explanations have raised doubts about how much priority Bangkok gives to technical cooperation. The International Crisis Group reported in October 2026 that Thailand had declined to restart the JBC's technical work, even though the body is central to resolving the land-border dispute.
Thailand did appoint a new head of its JBC delegation in July 2026, and that step should be acknowledged. Still, naming representatives is only a beginning. The real test of political commitment is whether those representatives sit down with their Cambodian counterparts and carry out actual fieldwork.
Thailand cannot keep stressing bilateral negotiations while the practical mechanism meant to carry them out remains idle.
Holding Ground While Avoiding Joint Verification
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the situation is the gap between what is said in diplomatic channels and what happens on the ground.
Cambodia has repeatedly objected to the presence and actions of Thai troops in areas it regards as its sovereign territory. Cambodian authorities have reported damage to civilian property, limits on the return of Cambodian residents, and activities that could alter the physical landscape of the border.
The International Crisis Group's October 2026 report described Thai forces as holding positions in contested areas, including territory it identified as indisputably Cambodian. It also noted Thailand's argument that the December 2025 ceasefire obliged both sides to keep their existing troop deployments.
That raises a basic question of international law and good-faith implementation: can a ceasefire meant to halt fighting be used to justify keeping control of land whose sovereignty is still disputed?
A ceasefire should prevent further violence and create room for peaceful negotiation. It should not be read as a territorial settlement or as recognition of sovereignty over land that another state claims.
If physical control persists while joint demarcation is put off, temporary military positions could harden into a permanent reality on the ground. That would erode trust in the bilateral agreements and make a lasting settlement far harder to reach.
Cambodia therefore has a legitimate basis to insist that all activity affecting the border environment be handled in line with the 2000 MoU and related agreements.
If Thailand Is Confident, Why Avoid Joint Verification?
A basic principle of peaceful dispute settlement is that both parties must be willing to have their claims examined objectively.
If Thailand truly believes the areas it currently controls belong to it, it has little reason to resist deploying joint technical teams. A confident position would be shown by allowing Cambodian and Thai experts to survey the ground, examine historical boundary records, verify existing markers, and compare relevant maps.
Cambodia is not asking Thailand to give up its claims without scrutiny. It is asking that the agreed technical process actually be carried out.
Joint verification would clarify the facts on the ground, reduce misunderstandings, and pinpoint exactly where disagreements remain. Both countries should make sure the process is transparent, professional, and free of military pressure.
Above all, neither side should alter the physical conditions of disputed areas while the technical process is still unfinished.
Thailand should show its commitment to peaceful relations through concrete action, not diplomatic statements alone. If its territorial claims rest on convincing legal and historical evidence, the JBC process offers the most direct way to demonstrate that.