One Year After the Kuala Lumpur Accord: Sovereign Defence, the AOT's Unfinished Work and the Right of Return for Displaced Cambodians

One year ago, on October 26, 2025, Cambodia and Thailand signed the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration. It was a meaningful diplomatic step toward easing border tensions and settling a long-running dispute by peaceful means. For Cambodia, the declaration matters less for what it secured from Thailand than for what it can do to protect the country's territorial integrity and allow families in border communities to return to normal life.
The first anniversary invites a basic question: has the peace process delivered the security and humanitarian relief it promised?
The Royal Government of Cambodia deserves credit for pursuing diplomacy, defending the country's territorial interests and working through regional mechanisms to keep tensions in check. The creation of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) was an important step toward monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. Its personnel work in a delicate environment, where impartial observation and clear communication can stop incidents from spiralling.
Still, a peace agreement should be judged by how it is carried out, not by the fact that it was signed. The absence of sustained fighting matters, but lasting peace also depends on restoring civilian livelihoods, looking into alleged violations and resolving the remaining border questions through peaceful means.
A year after Kuala Lumpur, the unfinished work is both territorial and humanitarian.
The Commitments: From Kuala Lumpur to Civilian Return
The Joint Declaration of October 26, 2025 reaffirmed commitments to de-escalation, respect for international law and peaceful resolution of disputes. It also set up the AOT framework and acknowledged existing bilateral bodies, including the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC).
The Joint Statement of the Third Special GBC Meeting, signed on December 27, 2025, went further by setting out more detailed operational commitments. Paragraphs 1 and 2 deal with the ceasefire and with keeping current troop deployments in place, without moving further toward the other side's positions. Paragraph 3 makes clear that these arrangements do not prejudice the international boundary or its demarcation.
The most important provision is paragraph 4, in which both parties commit to letting civilians who live in affected border areas return at the earliest opportunity. That return must be unobstructed, safe and dignified, and it must allow people to go back to their homes and livelihoods on their own side of the line.
Paragraph 12 recognises the AOT's role and calls for strengthening its verification function, in consultation with the ASEAN Chair and the AOT itself.
These commitments give both sides a basis for pressing for concrete progress. However, they must be read according to their actual wording and the AOT's Terms of Reference. The AOT's job is to verify. It is not a court that can decide sovereignty, and it does not hold enforcement powers that were never expressly granted.
The 2000 Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary also remains relevant. Together with later agreements, it provides a framework for dealing with boundary questions through established bilateral procedures. A ceasefire line, or the temporary holding of military positions, should not on its own be treated as a final decision on sovereignty.
The goal must be to ensure that temporary security arrangements do not undermine the boundary settlement, while making sure civilians are not left displaced indefinitely.
Ground Realities: Displacement and the Risk of Entrenched Disputes
The central humanitarian question is simple: can affected Cambodian families return safely to their homes, farm their land and resume their daily livelihoods?
Cambodia has alleged that Thai military personnel have kept positions in areas Cambodia claims, put up barriers or fortifications, and restricted civilian access. Allegations of this kind need independent verification of the exact locations, the boundary arrangements that apply and the conduct in question. They should not be treated automatically as established legal findings.
Restricted access can have serious effects. Families may lose their harvests and income and be cut off from their property, while being forced to rely on temporary aid. These hardships need urgent attention, whether or not the underlying territorial dispute has been finally resolved.
Where civilians are prevented from returning to areas on their own side, both parties should identify the obstacles and take practical steps to remove them. Where the boundary is still disputed, interim arrangements should be pursued through agreed mechanisms, without weakening either side's legal position.
Physical installations and long-term military presence can raise serious concerns if they go against agreed arrangements or make the dispute worse. A fence, an observation post or a period of physical control does not automatically transfer sovereignty or create lawful title. Its legal weight depends on the evidence, its location, the agreements that apply and the wider legal context.
The International Court of Justice's 1962 judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, along with its 2013 interpretation judgment, remains an important authority within its defined territorial and legal scope. However, it should not be presented as having settled every separate section of the Cambodia-Thailand boundary.
Humanitarian demining must also stay focused on protecting civilians. Both countries' obligations under the Ottawa Convention, along with their agreed coordination arrangements, should guide the work. Mine clearance should protect civilians, involve proper technical coordination and avoid creating unnecessary barriers to safe access.
The AOT: A Valuable Presence That Must Deliver Results
The AOT can improve communication, document incidents, support de-escalation and provide a more reliable basis for responding to events on the ground. How well it works depends on cooperation, access, clear operating rules and the timely release of verified findings.
The public has a legitimate interest in knowing whether the agreed measures are being carried out. Operational confidentiality may be necessary to protect personnel and keep diplomatic channels open, but it should not get in the way of meaningful accountability. At the same time, the lack of comprehensive public reporting does not, by itself, prove that the AOT has failed or that either party has obstructed its work.
A stronger approach would include regular compliance assessments that separate verified incidents from allegations, identify issues that remain unresolved and record the corrective steps taken. Public summaries should be published wherever operational considerations allow, with sensitive information kept protected.
Where observers are unable to inspect a relevant location, the reason should be recorded and alternative verification methods considered. Access disputes that remain unresolved should be referred to the agreed coordination mechanisms.
The AOT is not a supranational enforcement body, and it should not replace the JBC or decide territorial sovereignty. Its value lies in credible verification, timely communication and preventing miscalculation. Its agreed mandate must be implemented effectively.
Peace cannot be measured by the silence of weapons alone. A ceasefire may reduce immediate military danger, but if families still cannot go home and there is no credible process for resolving their situation, the peace remains incomplete.
Four Priorities for the Second Year
First, strengthen compliance reporting. Cambodia and Thailand should back regular assessments that cover verified incidents, access restrictions, alleged fortifications and corrective action. Reports should separate established facts from unresolved allegations and be transparent enough to build public confidence.
Second, establish monitored civilian-return arrangements. The parties should identify affected communities, document homes and farmland, and assess security conditions
First, strengthen compliance reporting. Cambodia and Thailand should back regular assessments that cover verified incidents, access restrictions, alleged fortifications and corrective action. Reports should separate established facts from unresolved allegations and be transparent enough to build public confidence.
Second, establish monitored civilian-return arrangements. The parties should identify affected communities, document homes and farmland, and assess security conditions