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November 15, 2026 • 8:16 AM
Business

Trade Imbalances: Why All the Fuss?

November 15, 2026
Trade Imbalances: Why All the Fuss?

China is not about to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy, at least not anytime soon, and perhaps never. For everyone else, the task is to adjust to a new international economic order, one shaped by growing fragmentation and constant disruption. Any newspaper will show you as much.

Headlines describe how “reciprocal tariffs” eroded confidence, pushed up prices and weakened the credibility of the World Trade Organization. I once discussed these questions with Professor Kimberly Clausing of UCLA, a tax law and policy expert, in Episode 19 of the CamEd Grand Interview, which gave me a useful introduction to the subject.

In his 2025 book The Fractured Age, economist Neil Shearing argues that we are living through a return of harsh great-power rivalry. “Fractured” may be the politest word for what has happened to the global trade system. Which countries will stay with the US-led bloc, and which will follow China? Most people hardly care, though I wonder whether undecided countries might be persuaded by the “middle powers” idea that Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney set out in his 2026 speech at Davos.

Thinking through these scenarios could leave a lot of cappuccinos going cold. Still, we should not try to recreate Einstein’s “happiest thought,” the image of a man falling from a roof, which eventually led him to his General Theory of Relativity.

What does physics have to do with geoeconomics? The laws of physics rest on proven mathematics and repeated observation. Our confidence in economics, by contrast, tends to fade as soon as we try to pin down the exact causes of a crisis.

As the old parable goes, a group of blind men will each describe an elephant differently, depending on the part they touch. They will keep touching, but the numbers do not lie.

Take the period from 1991 to 2007, the height of globalization. US spending on Chinese imports alone rose sevenfold, according to David Autor and his colleagues in “The China Syndrome” (American Economic Review, 2013). It is little wonder that American manufacturing workers lost jobs at home. Former US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer makes a similar argument in No Trade Is Free (2023).

China, the world’s second-largest economy, has run a trade surplus with the US since the late 1980s, and with most other major economies since the late 1990s. Is that inherently bad? Not necessarily. Trade imbalances, whether surpluses or deficits, are a normal part of international exchange. A country may export heavily to one market while buying most of its imports from others. Free trade works like a magic spell only if the wand is waved fairly.

When imbalances become too large and last too long, anger on the deficit side is almost inevitable. The rising cost of living that has sparked protests across European cities is a constant reminder.

When international politics is reduced to numbers, winners and losers are quickly labeled (Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp, Six Faces of Globalization, 2021). Trading partners who feel they are losing will not stay quiet. Given the scale of the imbalances, bilateral and multilateral relationships, and with them the global trade system, eventually have to be rearranged. Any adjustment is costly, no matter who ends up paying the most.

These adjustments often arrive as crises, as Michael Pettis (2026) explains. History offers several examples:

  • The 1930s Great Depression: US production was high, but domestic consumption was weak because wages were low. Americans borrowed heavily to fund consumption and asset bubbles. When adjustment came through protectionism, the US, then the largest exporter, suffered most from the collapse in global trade.
  • Latin America in the 1970s: The oil shock of the 1970s generated vast “petrodollar” surpluses in the oil-exporting Middle East. Much of that money flowed into Latin America, fueling a surge in public and private debt and, eventually, another crisis.
  • Japan and Germany in the 1980s: Productivity in both countries rose sharply, but wages did not keep pace. Their competitiveness produced huge surpluses, and the excess savings were funneled into property bubbles and unprofitable projects, with predictable results.
  • The 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis: As in Latin America, foreign capital poured in, and borrowers piled up debt to fund risky investments and asset bubbles. After a sharp capital flight, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines were badly hit.
  • The 2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lax regulation and low interest rates fed excessive borrowing, particularly in US subprime mortgages.

Managing and investing enormous amounts of capital has never been easy. Pettis covers these crises and others in “A Great Rebalancing Is Coming: Who Will Bear the Costs of a Global Trade Adjustment?” published in Foreign Affairs (August 2026).

With that history in mind, the uncomfortable truth is that a looming crisis should not be ignored simply because protectionism is fashionable again. Trade war rhetoric keeps getting louder, while my coffee sits untouched, too cold to drink.

Trade wars can be examined through a simple thought experiment: follow a cup of coffee back through every stage before it reaches a café. Unlike the falling man in Einstein’s thought experiment, the coffee beans travel a far less uneven path.

Where in that chain is taxation highest? In the farming regions where the beans are grown? At the border where they enter the importing country? Or mainly where they undergo their second transformation?

Rules of origin add another layer of complexity. Coffee passes through growing and harvesting, milling, shipping, roasting or blending, and finally retail packaging. The “substantial transformation” test used to determine origin is rather vague. For customs purposes, green Colombian beans become US-origin if they are roasted in the United States, since roasting counts as a substantial transformation. Yet consumer protection rules often lead to labels such as “Made in the USA from Colombian beans.”

If a product as simple as coffee is this complicated, imagine sophisticated machinery. Calculating trade imbalances from the total value of imports and exports yields tidy numbers that are easy to turn into political speeches. But do those figures capture the whole truth at every step? The answer is that it is far more complicated. At best, they are an imperfect approximation. So what is all the fuss about?

In a public lecture on trade imbalances a few weeks ago, I briefly mentioned the work of Keynes and Bown. In How to Win a Trade War (2026), they present one especially striking finding: “In a trade war, companies are terrible soldiers.” In other words, a trade war hurts different market players in very different ways.

Multinational firms with business units spread across several continents face the biggest headaches. In a capitalist system where corporations spend heavily on political campaigns, one can expect that once the news headlines have…

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